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Abstract: In this article we develop an account of justice in the distribution 
of knowledge. We first argue that knowledge is a fundamental interest that 
grounds claims of justice due to its role in individuals’ deliberations about 
the common good, their personal good and the pursuit thereof. Second, we 
identify the epistemic basic structure of a society, namely, the institutions 
that determine individuals’ opportunities for acquiring knowledge and 
discuss what justice requires of them. Our main contention is that a 
systematic lack of opportunity to acquire knowledge one needs as an 
individual and a citizen because of the way the epistemic basic structure of 
her society is organized is an injustice. Finally, we discuss how our account 
relates to John Rawls’s influential theory of justice.  
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JUSTICE IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Current theories of distributive justice focus on institutions that distribute 
goods such as income, wealth, liberties and opportunities and do not address 
the organization of institutions that are primarily concerned with the 
production and dissemination of knowledge. Given that knowledge is an 
essential good for human flourishing, democratic rule and just legislation, 
we argue that the distribution of certain kinds of knowledge deserves to be 
treated as a matter of justice in its own right and that the institutions 
primarily responsible for the distribution of knowledge are subjects of 
justice. To this end we develop a normative theoretical framework whose 
central element is what we call the epistemic basic structure of a society.1 By 
this we mean the institutions that have a crucial role in the distribution of 
knowledge, that is, in the production and dissemination of knowledge, and in 
ensuring that people have the capability to assimilate what is disseminated 
by providing them with the necessary educational background and 
intellectual skills.2 The epistemic basic structure includes institutions of 
science and education, media, libraries open to the public, and those 
government agencies and offices that carry out research or publish basic 
statistics. Our central claim is that justice requires that people have the 
opportunity to acquire knowledge about matters that they have an objective 
interest in as individuals and citizens, and this in turn requires that the 
epistemic basic structure of their societies produce and disseminate such 
knowledge and provide them with the capabilities they need for assimilating 
it. Accordingly, a systematic lack of opportunity to acquire knowledge one 
needs as an individual and a citizen to reason about the common good, her 
individual good and pursuit thereof because of the way the epistemic basic 
structure of her society is organized is an injustice. 
Before we proceed, some terminological clarifications are needed. 																																																								
1 Our use of this notion is inspired by but not identical with Rawls’s idea of the basic 
structure of a society see Rawls (1999: 6-10). 
2 Throughout this article when we speak of the distribution of knowledge, we refer to the 
processes of production and dissemination of knowledge, and ensuring individual capability 
to assimilate it. 




Throughout this article, by the term ‘knowledge’ we shall mean what 
Goldman has called weak knowledge, ‘which is simply true belief’ (Goldman 
1999: 24). Goldman distinguishes weak knowledge from strong knowledge 
which is true belief plus further conditions such as justification, warrant and 
conditions that would rule out Gettier cases. In this article we are concerned 
with weak knowledge rather than strong knowledge for three reasons. First, 
we wish to sidestep debates about what conditions other than true belief is 
necessary for strong knowledge. Second, on most accounts of the conditions 
to be added to true belief to have knowledge in the strong sense, there is an 
element of individual cognitive performance, which is the responsibility of 
the epistemic agent, and not down to the institutions that we shall be 
concerned with. Third, our arguments for treating the distribution of 
knowledge to be a matter of justice apply in the first instance to weak 
knowledge, and their extension to strong knowledge is not straightforward.  
A further clarification is needed. Our talk of distribution of knowledge 
should be read as shorthand for distribution of the opportunity to acquire 
knowledge. This qualification is needed for two reasons. First, there is no 
guaranteed way of acquiring true beliefs. Our most reliable way of acquiring 
true beliefs is through well-conducted research, and yet it is not a guarantee 
for acquiring knowledge; it is merely our best bet. Second, what justice 
requires is not that people know all the facts that they have an interest in, 
but that they can come to find out about them, or rather the results of well-
conducted research on them. Since the expression ‘the distribution of 
opportunity to acquire the results of well-conducted research which is highly 
likely to be true’ is too cumbersome, we will use the phrase ‘the distribution 
of knowledge’.  
Here is how we shall proceed. We first identify the various reasons why 
knowledge is a fundamental interest (section 2). We then identify the 
processes and institutions that have a key role in determining individuals’ 
opportunities for acquiring knowledge and outline what justice requires of 
them (sections 3 and 4). Finally, we discuss how the framework we develop 
in this paper can be incorporated into John Rawls’s influential theory of 
justice (section 5). 
 




2. THE OBJECTIVE INTEREST IN KNOWLEDGE 
We have a fundamental interest in certain kinds of knowledge as individuals 
and as citizens of liberal democracies. First, we need knowledge to 
deliberate about how we should live and the ends we should pursue, that is, 
on questions regarding the good life. Our deliberation about how we ought 
to live depends on having knowledge about various aspects of the world and 
different conceptions of the good life as well as possessing the conceptual 
resources and intellectual skills to carry out such deliberation. Second, we 
need knowledge to successfully pursue our ends. In addition to various 
resources and liberties, we need to have a more or less accurate conception 
of the world that will enable us to identify effective ways to pursue our ends. 
While the pursuit of some of our ends will require local and trivial 
knowledge that is easy to come by, the pursuit of other ends and the 
carrying out of long-term plans will require knowledge that can only be 
obtained through epistemic institutions.3  
We also need knowledge as citizens to ensure a well-functioning democracy. 
Democratic rule requires not only that citizens be able to express 
themselves, but also that they be sufficiently informed about issues that bear 
on the common good and have the opportunity to deliberate about them. 
Deliberating about the common good requires having knowledge about the 
needs and perspectives of other citizens, about how our society is 
performing with regard to issues that bear on the common good and which 
policies can further it. In the absence of a well-informed democratic process, 
we can expect neither sound policies nor legislation that treats the 
viewpoints and needs of all citizens with equal respect and concern. 
As citizens of authoritarian regimes know too well, an uninformed citizenry 
kept in the dark about the actions of its government is a recipe for tyranny. 
Democracy requires holding the government accountable to the citizens, 
which in turn requires a free press that can inform them of the actions of 
their government so that they can respond to them. The knowledge 
provided by a well functioning free press is one of the most effective means 																																																								
3 In addition to the instrumental value of knowledge in enabling us to lead a good life, 
many theorists of welfare would claim that knowledge is also intrinsically valuable and a 
component of the good life (Finnis 2011: 59-80). While we are sympathetic to this claim, 
our argument in this paper does not rest on it and is compatible with liberal neutrality. For 
a discussion of liberal neutrality see Kymlicka (1989), Rawls (1996). 




of fighting against repression and corruption. 
A further connection between democracy and knowledge emerges when we 
reflect on the Baconian idea that knowledge is power. Individuals’ and social 
groups’ chances of democratic participation and their ability to influence the 
political process depend not only on the financial and other resources they 
have, but also on the knowledge that they possess. People who have a more 
accurate conception of their social world, such as the existing networks of 
power, the workings of different political institutions, the possible results of 
certain policies and the current state of public opinion, will be in a better 
position to propose and implement policies that further their goals than 
those who lack such a conception. Therefore, inequalities in the distribution 
of knowledge can produce significant inequalities in political power that can 
undermine a democracy. Furthermore, well-informed people will be less 
vulnerable to misleading propaganda.  
In addition to being essential for democracy, certain kinds of knowledge are 
necessary for just legislation and its effective implementation. Just legislation 
is more likely if citizens are well informed and have had the opportunity to 
reflect on the common good. Furthermore, the successful realization of the 
ends adopted by society will require that the various institutions and 
professional bodies assigned with the task of realizing them have the 
requisite knowledge. Knowledge, therefore, contributes to just legislation by 
improving deliberations about the common good and ensuring that it is 
pursued effectively by the relevant institutions.  
In light of our survey of the interest in knowledge, we can offer a more 
nuanced understanding of justice in the distribution of knowledge. Lack of 
knowledge due to an unjust epistemic basic structure is both an injustice in 
itself and facilitates other injustices. An unjust epistemic basic structure is a 
source of injustice in itself because it denies some individuals the means to 
deliberate about and pursue their own good. An unjust epistemic basic 
structure also contributes to other injustices. First, it undermines political 
equality by providing some with greater chance to influence the political 
process. Second, it makes just legislation and effective policy less likely, 
because a society with a badly functioning epistemic basic structure will not 
have reliable information about the interests and conditions of its citizens 
relevant to its legislation and its policies. To cite one example, Marilyn 
Waring has forcefully argued that the United Nations System of National 
Accounts, which is used in the calculation of a country’s GDP and guides 




economic policy, excludes many economic activities typically engaged in by 
women, thereby making their labour invisible and resulting in policies that 
fail to take their interests into account (Waring 1988). Third, lack of 
knowledge and research can hinder the effective exercise and realization of 
many rights citizens have. Lack of knowledge, no doubt, can diminish 
people’s health, which will in turn narrow the range of opportunities open to 
them. Moreover, this lack can disadvantage particular groups, thereby 
raising questions of distributive justice. For example, there is “a lack of a 
concerted research and development effort to improve diagnostic testing 
methods or drugs and vaccine” for some tropical and parasitic diseases that 
inflict especially the poor and people of African descent in the U.S.A. 
(Hotez 2009). As these examples suggest, all of these harms caused by an 
unjust epistemic basic structure have a distributive element and give rise to 
considerations of fairness. 
A badly functioning epistemic basic structure also causes harms that impact 
everyone. For one thing, it can cause not only unjust but also bad policy 
choices. If, for instance, pharmaceutical research is conducted in ways that 
are unreliable, then everyone will suffer as a result. For another, if the 
population at large is ignorant of the grounds for sound policies, there will 
be a trade-off between them and democratic legitimacy since the population 
will be ignorant of the reasons that justify a given policy. Finally, a badly 
functioning epistemic basic structure undermines government accountability 
and makes abuse of political power more likely. 
Broadly speaking, then, the epistemic basic structure of a society has two 
roles relevant to justice. Its first role is to provide individuals in that society 
with the opportunity to acquire knowledge they have an interest in. Its 
second role is to enable institutions within a society, such as the health care 
system, bodies making economic policies, or the criminal justice system, to 
carry out their tasks by producing and disseminating the knowledge they 
need to carry out their specialized tasks. While a full treatment of the 
organization of the epistemic basic structure in a just society has to address 
both aspects of its organization, in this paper we focus for the most part on 
its first role.4  																																																								
4 Nevertheless, it’s worth pointing out that the two roles of the epistemic basic structure are 
interrelated for what individuals need to know to pursue their ends depends on the 
distribution of labour in a society. If there are people specialized in carrying out a certain 




The interest in knowledge has not been neglected by liberal theories of 
justice. In fact, freedom of expression, which is a sine qua non of liberal 
democracies, has often been defended by its role in facilitating both 
individual and collective deliberation and enabling people to acquire 
knowledge.5 However, freedom of expression is not enough, by itself, to 
ensure that citizens are informed about matters of common concern to all, 
or about matters concerning their individual well-being. Citizens of societies 
with stringent protection of freedom of expression such as the U.S.A. might 
remain ignorant about issues that bear significantly on their common good 
and individual well-being when the epistemic basic structure of their 
societies is not functioning properly. 
A cursory glance at the research on public informedness on crucial issues 
such as global warming, distribution of income and wealth, and the welfare 
services offered by the state confirms this worry. For example, despite the 
fact that the U.S. National Research Council’s 2010 report, which outlines 
the scientific consensus on the issue of climate change, states clearly that 
“climate change is occurring, is caused largely by human activities, and poses 
significant risks for—and in many cases is already affecting—a broad range 
of human and natural systems” (National Research Council 2010: 2), only 
34% of the U.S. population believes that the Earth’s climate is being 
affected by human-induced global warming (Pew Research Center 2010). 
Similarly, Americans “vastly underestimate the actual level of wealth 
inequality in the United States, believing that the wealthiest quintile held 
about 59% of the wealth when the actual number is closer to 84%.” (Norton 
and Ariely 2011). Finally, 53.3% of people who have received student loans, 
which are provided by banks but subsidized by the federal government, 
report that they have not used any government social programs (Mettler 
2010). Obviously, the public's being misinformed about these rudimentary 																																																																																																																																													
task for others, then people will not necessarily need to know how to carry out that task 
themselves, but will need knowledge to identify people who are competent. Naturally, the 
distribution of labour a society should adopt and inter alia the distribution of knowledge 
needed depends on many factors such as efficiency, cost etc. While we touch upon some 
aspects of these issues here, we plan to offer a detailed discussion in a separate paper.  
5Arguments similar to ours have often been used to defend freedom of expression as a 
necessary means for attaining knowledge. The connection between public deliberation and 
democratic rule is central to Meiklejohn’s defence of freedom of expression (Meiklejohn 
1948). Deliberation about different conceptions of the individual good and how best to 
pursue them is central to Cohen’s defence of freedom of expression, and of course Mill’s 
classical defence as well (Cohen 1993, Mill 1989). 




and uncontroversial but nonetheless highly relevant facts will seriously affect 
their political choices and the justice of resulting legislation. 
These shortcomings of freedom of expression to ensure, by itself, that 
citizens are well informed are not surprising.  As social epistemologists have 
emphasized, just as how we fare economically is determined by many factors 
over which we have little control as individuals -even when we have formal 
economic freedoms and formal equality of opportunity-, whether we can 
obtain accurate and reliable information depends on several institutions and 
practices over which we, as individuals, have little control (Goldman 1999; 
Kitcher 2011). A complex network of social institutions, what we have 
called the epistemic basic structure, determines individuals’ opportunities for 
acquiring knowledge. Accordingly, in addition to freedom of expression, the 
fundamental need for knowledge requires that the epistemic basic structure 
of societies be organized in ways that will enable people to acquire 
knowledge on matters that they have an interest in. 
Justice in the distribution of knowledge is not a matter of people having the 
opportunity to acquire knowledge regarding any question to which they 
would like to have the answer. It is only questions that bear on individuals’ 
plans of life and the common good that ground claims of justice.6 Even this 
construal of the interests that ground claims of justice in the distribution of 
knowledge might be too broad. For instance, a factory owner who wants to 
build a gadget at minimum cost has an interest in finding technologies that 
will decrease production costs. However, it is implausible to claim that this 
interest can ground a claim of justice even though such knowledge would 
enable the factory owner to pursue her ends more effectively. The pertinent 
distinction here is between knowledge as a private good and a public good. 
The knowledge that the factory owner is interested in is obviously a private 
good. The value of the knowledge she seeks is diminished when others have 
the same information. She is in a position to use the material resources at 
her disposal to pursue her interest in knowledge and be compensated, 
whereas someone who, for instance, wants find out about the health risks of 
a pollutant is not. 																																																								
6 It should be noted, however, that since lack of knowledge itself may prevent people from 
taking an active interest in some questions that bear on their life plans, questions that 
ground claims of justice should not be limited to those that are actual, but should also 
include what Goldman calls “dispositional” ones. These are questions a person would be 
interested if she only thought about them or knew some other facts (Goldman 1999: 95).  




There is another way in which not all knowledge that one has an interest in 
grounds claims of justice. Consider, for instance, a person’s interest in 
knowing whether it is raining outside. Knowing this can make a difference 
to the success of one’s short-term plans. Yet, it does not ground a claim of 
justice. The reason for this is that in order to know whether it is raining 
outside one does not need to depend on the institutional and extensive kind 
of social cooperation that characterizes the epistemic basic structure. One 
can just look outside. There is, then, a kind of division of labor implicit in 
our account. Certain items of knowledge don’t ground claims of justice 
because individuals can obtain them without having to depend on the 
epistemic basic structures of their societies. 
  
3. THE EPISTEMIC BASIC STRUCTURE: INSTITUTIONS AND 
PROCESSES  
We propose to identify the epistemic basic structure of a society as those 
institutions that have the greatest impact on individuals’ opportunity to 
obtain knowledge on questions they have an interest in through their role in 
the following three processes:  
(a) The production of knowledge through well-conducted research 
carried out by institutions of science, the media, and other major 
sites of knowledge production; 
(b) The dissemination of knowledge through the media, the Internet, 
the education system, libraries open to the public, and scientific 
publications aimed at the public;  
(c) Ensuring individual capability for assimilation of knowledge through 
the education system, that is, providing members of the public with 
the critical skills and background knowledge necessary for 
understanding and evaluating claims that are of interest to them.7 
																																																								
7 The distinction we are drawing among these three processes is an analytical one. In 
reality, often the same institution (e.g., the university) carries out more than one of these 
processes at the same time, and the same activity (e.g., publishing a research article) 
functions both as production and dissemination. 




Justice in the distribution of knowledge, as we shall understand it then, has 
to do with how well and fairly these processes are carried out in a society 
and whether the institutions we have identified as central are carrying out 
their tasks properly. To determine the justness of the distribution of 
knowledge in a society, borrowing a spatial metaphor, we can ask how far 
any subject S is from acquiring knowledge regarding the answers to 
questions that bear on the S’s life plans or deliberations about the common 
good. This depends on the following three factors:  
1. Production: Is there well-conducted research about the questions that 
S has an interest in?  
2. Dissemination: If so, have the findings of this research been 
disseminated? Can S access them? How costly is it for her to access 
them? Have the results of research been presented in a way that S 
can comprehend and evaluate?  
3. Ensuring individual capability for assimilation of knowledge: If S can 
materially reach the resources, has she been provided with the 
requisite educational background and intellectual skills to understand 
and evaluate them? 
This non-exhaustive list of considerations highlights how different social 
institutions involved in these three processes jointly contribute to an agent’s 
acquisition of knowledge about a given question. Such considerations 
combine concerns of reliability and distributive justice. For instance, we can 
ask not only whether research on a given question, which citizens have an 
interest in, is being carried out, but also whether it is reliable. The same 
goes for its dissemination: we are not only interested in whether it is 
disseminated to a wide population, but also whether it is disseminated 
accurately, and whether it is disseminated in ways that would allow people 
to ascertain the reliability of what has been disseminated. 
In what follows, we make a number of proposals about the proper 
organization of the epistemic basic structure. They naturally depend on 
complex empirical questions and would require further empirical research. 
Despite their tentative nature, we have included them for two reasons. First, 
they give a better sense of the policy questions that justice in the production 
of knowledge bears on. Second, they show that even in the absence of a 
canonical formulation of the principles of justice in the distribution of 
knowledge, we can identify ways in which the epistemic basic structure 
could become more just. 






When we view the epistemic basic structure from the perspective of justice, 
the first question to ask is whether there is well-conducted research being 
done on the issues that are relevant either to the common good or to an 
individual’s good. Well-conducted research should not be construed 
narrowly. Obviously, (natural and social) scientific research falls under this 
heading, but so does more mundane and less systematic kinds of research. 
Thus, well-conducted research includes, for example, investigative reporting 
by journalists, basic statistics and satisfaction surveys on aspects of political, 
economic and social life carried out by governmental and non-governmental 
organizations of various sorts. The reason for this broad construal is that 
many important life decisions depend on facts that can be obtained by 
relatively simple research: what is the relationship between college degrees 
and job opportunities in this country? What are the most paying jobs? What 
is the cost of living in this city?  How polluted is it? What is the crime rate 
in its neighborhoods? How good are its public schools? etc. 
Research carried out in the humanities also gives rise to claims of justice 
since it greatly contributes to deliberations about our own good and the 
common good both by systematically engaging in such deliberation and by 
providing us with conceptual resources to formulate our views and make 
sense of our experiences,8 ‘enlarging our sympathies’ as John Stuart Mill put 
it, and endowing us with the resources for greater self-understanding 
(Nussbaum 2010).  
What are the institutional preconditions for the production of well-
conducted research broadly construed? The answer naturally depends on the 
institution, and here we shall focus mostly (though not exclusively) on 
science. There are several reasons for this. First, science is arguably the most 
reliable institution of knowledge production in contemporary societies. 
Second, any well-conducted research relies on science to some degree. 																																																								
8 An apt example of this point can be found in Fricker’s discussion of what she calls 
‘hermeneutical injustice’. She observes that the formulation of concepts such as post-natal 
depression and sexual harassment has enabled women to understand and conceptualize 
their experiences, and observes how the absence of these concepts ‘hermeneutically’ 
disadvantaged them. See Fricker (2007: 147-152). 




Consider other knowledge-producing institutions like the National 
Weather Service, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. These government agencies and offices publish, among 
other things, reports about the weather and the climate, safety of drugs, 
social policies and statistics about almost all aspects of life that are relevant 
to the public good and the individual's good. Even the simplest 
demographic statistics they publish depend on the machinery made available 
by the science of statistics. Likewise, reports about unemployment rates and 
income per capita carry epistemic weight thanks in part to the science of 
economics. Science –natural and social– provides the epistemic 
infrastructure, so to speak, that makes possible much of well-conducted 
research done by diverse institutions and ensures the reliability of knowledge 
people need in their everyday lives. Finally, science is also often directly 
relevant to a number of important life decisions. Should I quit smoking? 
Should I consume genetically modified foods? Should I believe in the 
existence of an intelligent creator as the best explanation of complex life 
forms or should I believe in the theory of evolution? Answers to such 
questions depend in part on some basic knowledge of medicine and biology. 
Of course, ordinary citizens typically need only a small fraction of the 
scientific knowledge produced although they would need knowledge to 
identify experts and decide whom to trust. Scientific knowledge is much 
more needed by experts themselves who will carry out various tasks in light 
of it based on the division of labour that exists within their society. For 
instance, ordinary people do not need to have deep or extensive knowledge 
of medicine when they suffer from a health problem, their doctors do. 
Hence, an epistemic basic structure should be organized in such a way that 
necessary medical knowledge is produced and disseminated to the health 
care providers. Even then, however, we should not lose sight of the fact that 
the more informed a patient is about health issues the more benefit she can 
get from them.9  
Scientific research generally produces reliable knowledge, and reliability 
depends not just on the right application of appropriate scientific 
methodology, but also on adherence to certain institutional values and 
norms called “the ethos of science” that includes intellectual honesty, 																																																								
9 Indeed, health literacy has recently become an important goal of governments. See for 
instance U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Disease Prevention 
and Health Promotion (2010).  




objectivity, openness, common ownership of scientific knowledge, and 
recognition (Resnik 1998). Distortion or fabrication of data obviously 
results in unreliable conclusions. Similarly, failure to eliminate biases from 
experimental design, data analysis and interpretation can undermine the 
trustworthiness of findings. Secrecy and an excessively limited intellectual 
commons can prevent the scientific community from confirming the 
published results and stall scientific progress. Finally, when recognition is 
displaced by commercial interests as the main motive for carrying out 
research, unprecedented conflicts of interest might arise that compromise 
objectivity. 
A growing body of research suggests that the increasing commercialization 
of scientific research in certain disciplines (notably, biomedicine, 
pharmacology and genetics) has the effect of undermining the ethos of 
science, thereby diminishing its reliability (Bok 2003: 66-71; Krimsky 2004: 
27-52; Radder 2010; Resnik 2010). A changing regime of intellectual 
property rights and similar legal instruments, advocated by some for 
incentivizing innovation and stimulating economic growth, plays a crucial 
role in this (Jacob 2009; Jasanoff 2005: 225-246; Mirowski 2008). What 
kind of a regime of intellectual property rights would best promote the 
growth of science and ensure its reliability and dissemination is a 
complicated empirical question. However, our account suggests that we 
need to consider their influence on people’s opportunity to acquire 
knowledge in addition to their role in promoting or hindering economic 
growth and innovation.10 
The production of well-conducted research raises another important issue. 
Given that resources are scarce, how should the priorities for research be 
set? 
According to the current regime of science, they are determined by scientists 
and funding bodies (both private and public), but the interests of less 
privileged groups of people such as the poor and minorities tend to be 
neglected in research agendas. On the other hand, epistemically significant 
projects are sometimes pushed aside because they are perceived by an 
uninformed public as irrelevant to their practical needs. What is needed, 
therefore, is the establishment of mechanisms for democratically 																																																								
10 For an insightful discussion of intellectual property policies, see Fallis (2007a). 




determining research priorities in an informed way and identifying the 
primary considerations that should govern them.  
There are both theoretical efforts, mainly due to Philip Kitcher, and 
practical efforts underway to address this need. Kitcher's particularly well-
articulated theoretical model of “well-ordered science” presents an ideal of 
scientific inquiry, according to which ideal deliberators representative of all 
viewpoints in the society determine research agendas and the allocation of 
resources among them through deliberative reasoning informed by experts 
in each field (Kitcher 2001, 2011). As for practical efforts to increase 
representation in science policy decision-making, several democratic 
countries have recently adopted a variety of mechanisms to this end: 
citizens' juries and panels, consensus conferences, public opinion surveys, 
public hearings, referenda and the like (Bucchi and Neresini 2008). In this 
way, public participation in science is being more actively encouraged in the 
hope that research will come to reflect the interests of all rather than merely 
those of scientists and funders. 
Science of course is not the only institution that produces well-conducted 
research. So are, as we pointed out, investigative reporting and 
governmental organizations like the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the 
Food and Drug Administration. What are the preconditions necessary for 
them to produce reliable research?  Given their diversity, we can't do full 
justice to this issue here, but we can highlight some of those preconditions. 
Leaving the discussion of the media for the next section, we can say that the 
most important institutional precondition for government agencies and 
offices is arguably their relative autonomy to protect them from the 
pressures of governments and corporations that could cause biased results.11 
   
3.2 Dissemination 
For the vast majority of people the media is the single most important 
source of information about politics, public affairs and scientific findings in 
general. It is therefore vital that it provides the public with accurate, 
unbiased, and relevant information. By informing the public about how 																																																								
11 For the need to make the FDA independent from the corporate pressures see Angell 
(2005: 208-214 and 242-243). 




their government is performing, by providing a venue for raising various 
concerns and deliberating about different policies, and by acting as an 
intermediary between research findings and the general public, the media 
can contribute significantly to the political, intellectual and daily life of a 
society. 
A quick review of the current state of the media in some countries, for 
example in the United States, can point to some of the most important 
measures that need to be taken for a more just epistemic basic structure. The 
mass media in the United States is a commercial enterprise whose major 
source of revenue is advertisement. For that reason the interests of the 
advertisers influence the form and content of what is reported and who the 
media targets as their audience. Most of the newspapers, magazines, book 
publishers, and radio and television stations are owned by a handful of 
global-dimension firms as a result of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
(Bagdikian 2004: 3). Furthermore, due in large part to the media 
conglomerates' profit-driven strategies, journalism suffers from significant 
budget cuts, fewer staff, and a general atmosphere of job insecurity, all of 
which have contributed to the relaxation of professional news standards, the 
virtual disappearance of investigative journalism, and the increasing coverage 
of trivia and entertainment at the expense of serious news (Goldman 1999: 
182-188; McChesney 2008: 415-419). 
Accordingly, the availability of sufficient resources for investigative 
reporting, and legislation that would promote media diversity can drastically 
improve justice in the dissemination of knowledge. Similarly, certain 
changes in the norms of reporting can also contribute to a better 
understanding of public issues including scientific ones, some of which have 
a direct bearing on people's political choices. Consider, for instance, human-
induced global warming. Proponents of climate denialism have benefited 
greatly from the reporting conventions of the mainstream media that seek 
“balance” in the form of giving equal time to climate scientists and denialists 
(Jacques et al. 2008: 255; Oreskes and Conway 2011: 349-385). A more 
nuanced understanding of what objective reporting requires would do a 
much better job of informing the public about global warming. 
Information technology is increasingly becoming an indispensable tool for 
communication and for the acquisition of all kinds of knowledge that people 
have an interest in, which in turn empowers them economically (e.g., by 
finding out about available jobs) as well as politically (e.g., by finding out 




about the views of political actors)  (Fallis 2007b). In line with this, the 
United Nations has suggested, and a number of countries including France, 
Finland, and Estonia have recognized, access to the Internet as a right 
(Lucchi 2011: 676; Mathiesen 2012). Indeed, as Mathiesen argued, the 
right to the Internet can be seen as a ‘linchpin right’ since it facilitates the 
exercise of other human rights. Its satisfaction involves providing and 
maintaining a ‘critical infrastructure’ (such as servers and transmission lines) 
and also removing bureaucratic and financial barriers to access (Mathiesen 
2012). The removal of financial barriers will of course depend on the 
economic resources of a society. A radical solution is to make access to the 
Internet free for all. A more realistic solution is to make it affordable for 
most people. For those who cannot afford it, free Internet services might be 
established in public libraries in economically disadvantaged neighborhoods 
(Fallis 2007b: 38). 
The dissemination of scientific knowledge raises issues of its own. Cutting-
edge research is primarily of value to researchers themselves, and many 
contemporary societies provide their researchers access to it through their 
institutions. Despite this, commercialization of science can and does limit 
dissemination of scientific research in certain disciplines, a phenomenon 
known as 'trade secrecy', and consequently prevents researchers from 
confirming the accuracy of published results (Krimsky 2004: 82-85). This 
problem provides further support for our earlier suggestion that the negative 
influence of commercial interests on science should be mitigated. 
Even though scientific research is primarily of value to scientists, ordinary 
citizens will need to know some of it as well. Naturally, most research will 
be difficult for laypeople to comprehend and evaluate even when it is 
directly relevant to their important life decisions. Therefore, a just epistemic 
basic structure requires measures that will present the findings of scientific 
research relevant to their interests in ways that will be accessible to them.  
High-quality science journalism freed from the pressures of commercial and 
sensational publishing and guided by a public purpose is one measure that 
can increase both the accessibility of scientific research and its responsible 
reporting.12 Similarly, giving scientists incentives to write popular science 																																																								
12 The MMR vaccine-autism controversy in England in late 1990s and early 2000s is one of 
the many cases where sensationalist reporting has done serious damage, see Goldacre 
(2008: 273-314).    




books and articles on issues of general interest would serve the same purpose  
(Mooney and Kirshenbaum 2009). The policy of including lay abstracts of all 
scientific articles, a practice adopted by some medical journals, would be 
another measure. Finally, statements issued by scientific bodies indicating 
both the existing current scientific consensus and the problematic issues 
where a consensus is lacking can also be a useful source of information for 
all.  
Citizens will often need to be able to determine who has the relevant 
information to pursue their interests and which experts to trust. This they 
can do by asking questions like the following (Anderson 2011: 145-149; 
Goldman 2001): To which research institution does the putative expert 
belong and what are her credentials? Have her claims been subjected to peer 
review? What were the sources of funding for her research? Did she have 
any conflicts of interests? A just epistemic basic structure should make the 
information, which would enable people to answer these questions, easily 
available. Indeed, a number of scientific (especially medical) journals now 
routinely provide this sort of information for their readers and others can 
follow suit. The media too, when presenting the views of experts, could 
adopt a similar practice and even offer a careful summary of past debates 
that they have been a part of, the objections that have been raised to their 
claims and their responses.13 
 
3.3 Ensuring individual capability for assimilation of knowledge 
Even if the institutions dealing with the production and dissemination of 
knowledge are in order, members of society can fail to benefit from the 
knowledge these institutions provide when they lack the necessary 
intellectual skills and background knowledge. For this reason, justice in the 
distribution of knowledge requires that people be provided with an 
education equipping them with (a) scientific literacy, which includes 
knowledge of basic scientific facts and a general understanding of scientific 
methods; (b) numerical literacy, which also includes an understanding of the 																																																								
13 Since our proposal requires institutions making some facts about themselves public, it 
entails redrawing the boundary between what is properly considered public and private 
knowledge. However, given the public nature of these institutions and the public interest at 
stake, such redrawing of the boundary seems justified.  




basic concepts of statistics since much of the information that bears on 
social and political issues relies on statistical data; (c) critical reasoning skills 
that enable citizens to evaluate arguments offered to them; (d) computer 
literacy, since computers and the Internet are the main sources for acquiring 
knowledge in contemporary societies; and (e) some knowledge of the 
cognitive biases to which human beings are prone so that they will be able, 
in some cases, to avoid them and, in others, be more receptive to scientific 
findings that clash with their intuitive judgments. This is not an 
unachievable ideal. A good basic education can provide all or almost all of 
the skills and knowledge in question. 
 
4. PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
KNOWLEDGE 
We have not attempted to provide a canonical formulation stating the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of justice in the 
distribution of knowledge, or, to put it differently, for when the distribution 
of opportunity for acquiring knowledge is just. We doubt that such a 
formulation is possible. Individuating facts or beliefs about facts is next to 
impossible. Moreover, beliefs are interrelated, and the revision of one belief 
may result in further revisions. Both of these points make comparison of 
how two individuals fare epistemically difficult. 14  
Our proposals are not, in the first instance, concerned with bringing 
about a specific distribution of opportunity for acquiring knowledge within a 
society. Rather, we are concerned with how the epistemic basic structure of 
a society is organized and whether it serves the needs of people. As our 
discussion in the previous section demonstrates, substantive proposals can 
still be made without a fully worked out set of principles for the distribution 
of knowledge.  
Two further clarifications are in order. First, measures required to promote 																																																								
14 For an excellent discussion of these difficulties see Treanor (2013). Treanor also makes a 
positive proposal about how to unpack our ordinal judgements regarding knowing more or 
less in terms of our representations of the world being more or less similar to the way the 
world is. However, as he notes, his proposal also does not produce a quantifiable measure 
(Treanor 2013: 596-7). 




justice in the distribution of knowledge are not only compatible with, but 
also require, in some cases, maintaining autonomous institutions. It would 
also be a mistake to assume that all requirements of justice in the 
distribution of knowledge are to be enforced by law. Some of these 
requirements are norms that should be adhered to by members of the 
relevant bodies but not legally enforced, and it is possible to criticize existing 
norms in light of the harm they do to the opportunities of people for 
acquiring knowledge. So, for example, when we object to climate denialists 
being given equal time for the sake of objectivity, we are not suggesting that 
they should be censored, but only that the media should work with a more 
nuanced understanding of what objectivity requires of their reporting.  
Similarly, we are not in favor of tight controls over the media. Our 
argument isn’t that freedom of expression should be limited, but that it 
should be supplemented with certain institutional measures and norms that 
will enable people to acquire the knowledge they have an interest in. We are 
not suggesting that the state should always intervene directly with the 
institutions that make up the epistemic basic structure. Rather, it can 
improve their functioning by ensuring certain background conditions such 
as preventing monopolies in media ownership.  
Second, on our account, justice in the distribution of knowledge requires 
that people have the opportunity to obtain knowledge on questions they 
have an interest in. It does not put forth a perfectionist and unattainable 
ideal of each individual becoming an expert on every topic. It requires only 
that when they are curious about a question they have an interest in, they 
should have the means to obtain knowledge about it. 
  
5. JUSTICE IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE AND 
RAWLS’S THEORY OF JUSTICE 
We have argued that the basic interest in knowledge, which also 
underwrites freedom of expression, can be satisfactorily served only when 
the epistemic basic structure of a society is organized with a view to ensuring 
justice in the distribution of knowledge by providing everyone with the 
opportunity to acquire knowledge on matters they have an interest in.  In 
this section, we illustrate how the framework we have developed in this 
paper can be incorporated into Rawls’s theory of justice.  




Rawls’s theory of justice deals with the distribution of what he calls primary 
goods (basic rights and liberties, freedom of movement, and free choice 
among a wide range of occupations, income and wealth, the powers of 
offices and positions of responsibility, and the social bases of self-respect) 
(Rawls 2001: 58-9). These are goods necessary for the development and 
exercise of the two moral powers: the capacity for a sense of justice ― “the 
capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from the public conception of 
justice which characterizes the fair terms of social cooperation” ― and the 
capacity for a conception of the good ― “the capacity to form, to revise, and 
rationally to pursue a conception of one's rational advantage or good” 
(Rawls 1996: 19). According to Rawls’s first principle of justice, “each 
person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights 
and liberties”, where basic liberties include freedom of expression and 
political liberties (Rawls 1996: 5).   
Rawls’s theory of justice gives a prominent place to freedom of expression 
because it is essential for the adequate development and exercise of the two 
moral powers. Freedom of expression contributes to the exercise and 
development of our sense of justice by enabling us to take part in the 
political process and deliberate about the common good. It contributes to 
the exercise and development of a capacity for a conception of the good by 
enabling us to reason about different conceptions of the good. These 
arguments for taking freedom of expression to be a primary good also apply 
to knowledge. Knowledge can be considered a primary good because of the 
role it plays in people’s deliberations about their own good and the common 
good, that is, its role in the exercise and development of their capacity for a 
conception of the good and their capacity for a sense of justice respectively.  
Even though it is not treated at length, people’s interest in knowledge is 
acknowledged by Rawls in his discussion of the requirements of his 
principles of justice. When speaking of basic liberties and their priority, 
Rawls maintains that they “are to guarantee equally for all citizens the social 
conditions essential for the adequate development and the full and informed 
exercise of their two moral powers” (Rawls 2001: 112, emphasis added). 
When discussing the equal worth of political liberties he requires he writes,   
All citizens should have the means to be informed about 
political issues. They should be in a position to assess how 
proposals affect their well-being and which policies advance 
their conception of the public good (Rawls 1999: 198). 




One characteristic of a well-ordered society, according to Rawls, is publicity, 
which entails that citizens affirm his principles of justice, know that the 
basic structure of their society satisfies these principles and recognize the 
general facts in light of which parties in the original position choose 
principles of justice (Rawls 2001: 121). These facts include “the methods 
and conclusions of science when not controversial” (Rawls 2001: 90). This 
indicates that Rawls assumes citizens in a society that is just by his standards 
having access to a significant body of knowledge.  
Moreover, when discussing fair equality of opportunity, Rawls does not 
limit the scope of opportunity to positions. He suggests that people who are 
equally talented and motivated should have “equal prospects of culture and 
achievement” and emphasizes the importance of education “in enabling a 
person to enjoy the culture of his society and take part in its affairs” (Rawls 
1999: 639, emphasis added). Therefore, the concern with a just epistemic 
basic structure is one that Rawls’s theory of justice can take on board and 
can be said to implicitly assume.  
Indeed, some commentators have argued that Rawls should treat “access to 
information” as a primary good (van den Hoven and Rooksby 2008). 
However, from our perspective van den Hoven and Rooksby’s account has 
serious shortcomings because the idea of an epistemic basic structure is 
absent from their framework. They are concerned only with “access to an 
informative object such that that access would be sufficient to produce 
knowledge” (van den Hoven and Rooksby 2008: 381, emphasis in the 
original).15 Ensuring this, they suggest, “may involve distribution of 
information-bearing objects, or ensuring that individuals have ready access 
to such objects” (van den Hoven and Rooksby 2008: 381). Thus, they are 
concerned with only a subpart of what we have discussed under 
dissemination of knowledge. The production of knowledge itself, the 
reliability and fairness in the dissemination of knowledge - except for people 
having access to sources of information- and making sure that people have 
the capability to assimilate the knowledge that has been disseminated is 
absent from their account. A society in which people have access to 
information in the way van den Hoven and Rooksby conceive of it can fail 
to provide its members with the opportunity to acquire knowledge because 
they lack the necessary intellectual skills or because the knowledge they need 																																																								
15 Fallis (2007b) also suggests that knowledge is a primary good, but does not develeop the 
idea. 




is not produced at all.  
The fact that people’s opportunity to acquire knowledge depends on the 
workings of the epistemic basic structure of their societies also explains why 
a Rawlsian society would need to address its organization. It is likely that a 
society that realizes Rawls’s two principles of justice can be expected to do 
better than contemporary societies with respect to justice in the distribution 
of knowledge since people who have their fair share of economic resources 
and freedom of expression will have more opportunities for obtaining 
knowledge on matters they have an interest in. However, the fact that 
people will do better within a given epistemic basic structure is not the same 
as there being a well-functioning and fair epistemic basic structure. A 
Rawlsian society will have to take measures so that its epistemic basic 
structure is functioning well enough to address justice in the distribution of 
knowledge, that is, its knowledge producing and disseminating systems such 
as science, media, the Internet, various governmental agencies and offices 
are all functioning properly. A Rawlsian society can incorporate many of the 
measures we have suggested as means of realizing the equal worth of 
political liberties and ensuring fair equality of opportunity, and it may, more 
directly, treat the opportunity to acquire knowledge as a primary good. 
None of the measures we have proposed will require major revisions to 
Rawls’s theory, but they will mean that Rawlsians should treat the epistemic 
basic structure of a society as falling under the purview of justice –an issue 
which has been neglected in discussions of Rawls’ theory.  
No doubt, justice in the distribution of knowledge is only one consideration 
of justice among others, and its promotion may be rightly limited when it 
conflicts with certain freedoms and other requirements of justice. Moreover, 
ensuring a just distribution of knowledge may not be the only thing people 
demand from the epistemic basic structure of their societies. They may want 
it to contribute, for example, to economic growth by fostering innovation. 
Accordingly, the way the epistemic basic structure of a society would need 
to be organized if our only concern were with justice in the distribution of 
knowledge and how it ought to be organized when other aspects of justice 
are also taken into account need not be the same. A full treatment of the 
relationship between the epistemic and other components of justice, which 
would identify the relevant tradeoffs and how they should be settled, 




requires further research.16 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Despite the fact that knowledge is a good no less important than standard 
goods like income, wealth, liberties and opportunities, existing theories of 
justice do not consider its distribution to be a matter of justice. The purpose 
of this article has been to show that the distribution of knowledge deserves 
to be treated as a matter of justice in its own right. Like most goods, 
knowledge too can be produced, disseminated, obtained and enjoyed, and 
the function of what we have called the epistemic basic structure of a society 
is to ensure precisely that. Systematic deprivation of the opportunity to 
acquire knowledge as a result of an unfairly organized and/or poorly 
functioning epistemic basic structure constitutes an injustice no less serious 
than income- or liberty-deprivation. Injustice in the distribution of 
knowledge also facilitates other injustices such as inequalities in healthcare, 
a distorted political process, not to mention ineffective and unjust 
legislation. It is also a precondition for the effective exercise of many rights 
that people have.   
In this article, we have focused on institutions that make up the epistemic 
basic structure of society and not addressed individual epistemic norms. 
This is not because individual epistemic norms do not influence individuals’ 
opportunity to acquire knowledge –they certainly do. However, we think 
that the study of the norms required to ensure equality of opportunity to 
acquire knowledge are better worked out with an institutional framework in 
place. The same set of individual epistemic norms can have significantly 
different effects when the background insittutions are different. Moreover, 
the instituitional background can influence the norms that individuals 
adhere to as the erosion of the ethos of science under increasing 
commercialization indicates. We are also not suggesting that the only 
considerations of justice that bear on  the epistemic basic structure and 
individual epistemic norms are ones that influence people’s opportunity to 
acquire knowledge. For instance, as Miranda Fricker has shown in her 
pioneering work, there is an epistemic injustice ‘when prejudice causes a 																																																								
16 We owe this point to an anonymous referee.  




hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker's word’, because it 
denies them the status of a giver of knowledge and a being possessing reason 
(Fricker 2007: 1, 44).17 By pointing to the myriad ways our epistemic lives 
depend on social processes, social epistemologists have made it  possible to 
ask how considerations of justice bear on epistemic practices and 
institutions. The considerations we discussed in this paper are one such set 
of considerations but certainly not the only one. 
Extending the scope of justice to include knowledge and the epistemic basic 
structure, we believe, not only fills a lacuna in contemporary theories of 
justice, but also provides us with a powerful discourse for underlining and 
addressing certain kinds of injustices that might be downplayed or outright 
ignored. Our account of justice in the distribution of knowledge has also the 
advantage of treating diverse social institutions such as science, media, 
schools, certain government offices as well as political concerns about 
democratic self-rule and just legislation from the same perspective within a 
unifying normative theoretical framework. Such a framework, we hope, can 
contribute to the articulation of demands such as the right to Internet 
access, increased transparency in scientific research, greater public 
understanding of science, a press that can function as a fourth estate, and 
(continued) public funding of universities and at the same time identify a 
normative commitment shared by them.  
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